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The Politics of “Parental Co-Habitation”:
Austerity, Household, and the Social Evils
of Dependency
JOHN WELSH
Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
ABSTRACT The household as a social formation is being assigned a renewed function in
the provision of social welfare via neoliberal austerity politics. Government inaction regard-
ing housing provision is forcing millions of young adults into “parental co-habitation”. In
contrast to the dominant ideological view of the family as a school of liberty through the
provision of welfare, this article argues that the dependence of millions of young adults on
the parental household is degenerative both for the individual “recipient” and for the future
democratic character of the polity. Mobilizing a Neo-Roman analysis of Liberty, I argue that
housing policy is promoting the long-term creation of “slaves” as part of a wider strategy of
oligarchic domination. The article seeks to articulate an explicitly political theoretical
critique of “parental co-habitation” and advocates for directed government action in the area
of housing provision to secure the autonomy and independence of a generation otherwise
reduced to “slavishness”.
KEY WORDS: Housing, Family, Welfare, Liberty, Neoliberalization, Neo-Roman
It is certainly an open question whether the development of this biopolitical
fabric will allow us to build sites of liberation or rather submit us to new forms
of subjugation and exploitation. We have to decide here, as the ancients used to
say, whether to be free men and women or slaves, and precisely this choice is at
the basis of the establishment of democracy today (Hardt and Negri 2005, 285).
Introduction
Over the last several years, we have come to a crossroads in the United Kingdom
thrown up by the politics of Austerity and a re-invigorated prosecution of Neoliberal-
ization in the interests of the property-power nexus. Affected profoundly by massive
reconfigurations in the global regime of capital accumulation, life in the core states
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is being transformed through new modulations of capitalist Governentality and
Disciplinarity in the 21st century “Societies of Control” (Deleuze 1992; Lazzarato
2015). The general election victory for the British Conservatives (2015) promises
five more years of so-called National Austerity, the Government’s new Housing and
Planning Act (2016) threatens the remaining social housing stock in London and
beyond, and the possibility of withdrawal from EU membership promises to bind
ever tighter the property-power nexus of City-State Britain.
In the historical articulation of modern capitalism that is Neoliberalism, Austerity
has emerged as a response to the crisis in the dominant model of capital accumula-
tion (Overbeek and van Apeldoorn 2012, 3). Specifically it is a politically transfor-
mative regime of meta-disciplinary strategies and tactics (Welsh 2016), ensuring, at
least in the short to mid-term, the continuity of capital accumulation across the
terrain of the capitalist world-system, but in a manner that does not challenge the
oligarchic political power structures and the social hegemony of the capitalist class
established through the neoliberal period (Harvey 2005). We are dealing here with
another instance of the dispossession of individuals through a socio-political technol-
ogy that effects the productive relations of possession (Poulantzas 2014, 18).
Amidst these historic social forces, the question of Housing as a component of
social welfare in our nominally democratic society once more materializes around
us, as it does for every generation concerned with its future well-being. As house
prices have spiralled away from average income levels, driven up by the buying-
to-let of speculator-landlords and the consequent circularity of soaring exchange-
values (Sprigings 2008, 77, 86), more and more individuals are deprived of access to
the use-value of housing. This is having profound psychosocial effects in the consti-
tution of the family household.
In the current politics of Austerity, the nuclear household has once again been
appropriated, discursively and institutionally, to take on a contingent and transforma-
tive role in the (re)arrangements of post-welfare capitalism. Specifically, the family
household is being mobilized out of a technical social fragment and forged into a
strategic technological vertex that offers a range of tactical political possibilities for
the deployment of class-power in accord with the imperatives of the emergent post-
crisis regime of capital accumulation that is Austerity. Once again, we are dealing
with the perennial “capitalist attempt to impose scarcity and dependence as structural
conditions of life” (Federici 2004, 115), where such an endeavour, far from being a
natural necessity, is rather highly contingent and thus political. A contingent politics
of “locally” enforced scarcity (“locality” being taken in the most versatile and figura-
tive sense), in this case regarding the provision of housing, arises strategically as
both a periodically acute and structurally chronic “necessity” within the capitalist
mode of production so as to establish conditions propitious for the reinitiating of
reproductive cycles of capital accumulation, the concomitant extraction of capital
surpluses and financialized transfers to dominant social fractions in the form of
monopoly-rent (Harvey 1972, 9). The shortage of affordable housing for certain
sections of society therefore functions according to an identifiable political Reason,
the Reason of capitalist discipline.
However, the aim of Austerity as one strategic set of policies amongst many
possible alternatives, is to achieve a transitional “spatio-temporal fix” for the domi-
nant accumulation model of capital undergoing crisis (Harvey 2006, 2010), but
where “the spatial organisation of society [is] being restructured to meet the urgent
demands of capitalism in crisis – to open up new possibilities for super-profits, to
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find new ways to maintain social control” (Soja 2010, 34). Expansion of access to
housing options would still contribute to “spatio-temporal fixes” in capitalist society,
but would be detrimental to the political dominance of oligarchic fractions that have
spent the last 30 years of neoliberal government restoring themselves to that position
(Harvey 2006, ix–xxvii). Much better that 3.3 million young people in the British
polity, for instance, be reduced to a slavish condition through deprived access to
affordable housing, than to pursue reform that would challenge the political eco-
nomic basis of their class-power.
Our basic problem is how to harness the strategic power of government to put
roofs over our heads in a manner properly consistent with democratic principles,
regardless of the attempts by dominant social fractions to retard via austerity politics
any such development. It is therefore imperative to consider the potential social and
political consequences of a failure to do so, and to articulate intellectually the neces-
sary political theoretical arguments for why this is so important and necessary for the
future of the democratic polity, in order for others subsequently to contrive purpo-
sively motivated and more detailed and concrete formulations in housing policy. This
article thus attempts to provide a more intellectual advocacy for decisive government
action to make housing more affordable for the citizenry at large, and to make clear
the reasons why this is especially desirable beyond the obvious.
What I have to contribute here applies to a very great extent across the capitalist
core states generally. As we shall see, the political nature of the social problem that I
will analyse in what follows is not confined to the social policy of any single nation
or state. We are faced with a much more general ideological battle across the con-
temporary capitalist world-system that must be fought transnationally with quick feet
over a much broader terrain. However, I shall be principally concerned here with the
British case, representing as it does the most acute instance of the phenomena under
consideration, and it is primarily with the reconfiguration of the British State into a
city-state predicated on London as a Global City that I am implicitly concerned. It is
a marked feature of the British particularity that the outward “ripple effect” from the
housing market of the metropole adversely effects the rest of the state-territory
(Cameron, Muellbauer, and Murphy 2006, 23; Sprigings 2013, 18). I shall be explor-
ing elsewhere the socio-historical forces that are constitutive of the especially acute
disciplinary transformation of the British State over recent decades,1 and it is within
that agenda that I want to think analytically on one instantiation of those disciplinary
social forces. That instantiation is the intensifying problem of affordable housing,
and I shall make my more general argument regarding the provision of affordable
housing via a treatment of the more particular emergent phenomenon of “parental
co-habitation”.
The Social Problem: Hikikomori, Austerity and the Family Household
Firstly, we must set out the psychosocial problem that our critical theory seeks to
address. From the outset of The Lost Decade (1991–), a remarkable social phe-
nomenon began to emerge in Japan: Hikikomori. Literally meaning “withdrawal,
pulling inward, being confined” (Saito 2013), this descriptive term became applied
to young adult individuals who were forced by socio-economic circumstance to
return to, or remain in, their family homes where previous generations had been able
to acquire the social and material means to live and be housed independently
(Furlong 2008; Kremer and Hammond 2013). Prolonged economic depression,
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mounting education costs, high real estate prices, wage repression and other “issues
related to late capitalism” (Kaneko 2006, 234), combined with exacerbating Japanese
cultural specificities, and drove ballooning numbers of young Japanese back into liv-
ing under the financial and material care of their parents. Due to a particularity of
the Japanese family dynamic, this movement commonly resulted in a further
“withdrawal” into subspaces within the home (usually bedrooms), where these young
people would practically become hermetic recluses (Teo 2012). The effects were
devastating, and led to the emergence of the Hikikomori concept as a recognized
social problem. One Japanese youth summarized the psychological effects:
“I had all kinds of negative emotions inside me”, he says. “The desire to go
outside, anger towards society and my parents, sadness about having this con-
dition, fear about what would happen in the future, and jealousy towards the
people who were leading normal lives” (Kremer and Hammond 2013).
Since that time, the phenomenon has not receded. In fact, the only change is that the
average age of the Hikikomori seems to have risen over the intervening Two Lost
Decades. Before it was 21, now it is 32 (Kremer and Hammond 2013). Since the
onset of depression conditions in Europe, an approximation of Hikikomori is being
realized in numerous other capitalist core states as the political project of Austerity
has been implemented in Europe and the United States. Hikikomori might not be a
perfectly accurate analytical label for what is happening elsewhere than Japan, but it
is useful as a means of getting a handle on a disconcertingly similar set of
developments subject to a historical time delay. So, far from a direct transposition of
Hikikomori into a Western context, one ought to think here of the phenomenon in
Europe and the US as bearing a striking similarity in its broad strokes and result-
ing from a similar set of social and historical forces in the neoliberal capitalist
world-system. Most importantly, the Hikikomori phenomenon ought to alert us to the
probable, though as yet unrealized, psychosocial immiseration building up as a
consequence of the political, contingent and strategic regime of Austerity, on the
basis of which strategic social policy questions such as housing are being taken in
states like the UK.
In January 2014, the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) released data reveal-
ing that 26% of British youth aged 20–34 were living at home with their parents as
of 2013.2 This constitutes some 3.3 million individuals across the UK. However, this
trend is not a British eccentricity, but is part of a more widespread tendency across
the capitalist core states. Spanish youth unemployment in 2014 was at 55%, with
just under 50% of 18–29 year-olds now living with their parents (Buck 2014). In
Italy the situation is even worse, sparking references to a “Mammone” phenomenon
as 66% of Italians aged 18–34 now live directly under their parents’ auspices (Day
2015). Even in the United States, where the regional picture is somewhat varied and
where unemployment levels are lower, it is claimed that as many as 36% of
18–31 year olds live with their parents as of 2012 (Fry 2013). This “Parental
Co-Habitation” figure is drawn from US Census Bureau data. In the American case,
rising education costs is an added causal factor (Shah 2015), but in the more densely
populated North East and Californian coasts the cost of housing is still decisive
(Davies et al. 2014). These figures admittedly do not communicate anything on the
socio-cultural differences in family structure or behavioural proclivity between these
various societies or regions, which could of course explain much regarding the
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respective levels of parental co-habitation in each case. However, aside from a desire
not to fall into easy stereo-typing (Italian “mummy’s-boys” etc.), we shall see from
the anecdotes of Maria and Gaia below that the desire for autonomous living inde-
pendent of parental supervision is a fairly widespread aspiration amongst European
and American youth. Even admitting some socio-cultural variation in behaviour or
preference patterns, the abstract argument below still stands for a great many individ-
uals throughout the capitalist core.
So, cultural differences, statistics and damn lies aside, it is clear that across the
advanced capitalist core states there has been a definite trend toward ever-greater
numbers of young adults being forced to live under the personal and financial
supervision and suffocating physical proximity of their parents in the family home.
This trend has doubtless been intensified by the austerity regimes systematically
implemented since 2010, but is also part of a much longer historical narrative in
post-welfare neoliberal political economy across Europe and North America entailed
by rising student debt burdens (Weissmann 2015), low wage growth (Shah 2015)
and insurmountable accommodation costs (Davies et al. 2014; Vespa and Burd,
2014). When it comes to this latter question of the housing market, in the British
case “the problems faced by young first time buyers in this market are very clear as
prices accelerate away from their low inflation incomes” (Sprigings 2008, 83). From
the late-1960s to the end of the century, the ratio of average house price to average
income remained around 3.1 throughout the period (Sprigings 2013, 17–18). How-
ever, just in the first decade of this century, the ratio of lower quartile house price to
lower quartile income levels in England and Wales has risen steadily from 4 (2000),
through 5.2 (2003), to 7.1 (2006), reaching as high as 12.1 in some areas of London
and persisting since then around a national average of 6 (Chu 2016). Clearly, access
to the use-value of housing has been increasingly restricted for many citizens, partic-
ularly younger ones, over the last couple of decades.
The common implicit assumption is that these individuals are irresponsible, indo-
lent and inconstant; a predictable behavioural characteristic of the Sunny Delight
generation, and that an investigation into more systematic causes is therefore not
necessary. However, without even going into more thoughtful arguments to the con-
trary, this is not born out by the recently released statistics that show how in Britain
roughly the same proportion of those living with parents are in full-time employment
as those who live independently.3 Evidently, it is the prohibitive costs of living, in
terms of basic utilities, enforced debt burdens and accommodation costs, that are
pushing even the fully employed back in with baby-boomer parents (Cumming
2013), whose generation fortuitously cashed in on the post-war rising-tide and then
evaded the wage repression of the 1980s-2000s by resort to personal asset price
inflation, that is, steadily rising household equity (Panitch and Gindin 2011, 12). In
generational terms, we are emphatically not all in the same boat (Reich 1991, 4–5).
The nuclear family household is a fundamental unit in the social matrix of disci-
plinary control and production that is advanced capitalism. I work from the critical-
theoretical assumption that there is no ontological necessity entailed in the family
household as a social formation, and that attempting to ground such a claim in the
universal, the eternal, or the natural – a typical manoeuvre in patriarchal and conser-
vative discourses (Barrett and McIntosh 2014, 26–29, 33–40) – is profoundly dubi-
ous. The family household is rather a historically contingent formation that has
coalesced throughout capitalist core states in socially particular and culturally local
configurations that are under constant reformation and re-articulation.4 However,
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variation of form is marginal, and the nuclear family household remains a highly
stable modulation across the capitalist core.
As has been the case throughout the history of modern capitalism from its early-
modern emergence, the household is once again being given what Silvia Federici
identified as a “new importance as the key institution providing for the transmission
of property and the reproduction of the workforce” alongside its disciplinary role of
“supervision of sexuality, procreation and family life” (Federici 2004, 88).
In concrete terms this means that UK government policy is purposively devolving
responsibility for the welfare of citizens onto the family household as “the last fron-
tier of welfare” (Quoting La Stampa, Day 2015), via the Austerity politics of a
neoliberal capitalism in a “catastrophic equilibrium” of politico-social forces. In The
Pinch (2011), David Willetts, as former Conservative Secretary of State variously for
Families, Universities, Children, Schools, inter alia, described the post-war nuclear
household as “a kind of mini-welfare state”, by which the structured patriarchy
implicit in post-war society became inscribed into a political apparatus. This is an
apparatus through which “the man’s earnings are transferred to four dependents” as
a necessary tactical device that ensures his continued dominance (Willetts 2011,
Chap. Two). In various conservative circles this move is actually deemed beneficial
to the political and individual well-being of a democratic and prosperous society.
This broad policy move is implicitly assumed to spread, promote, secure and deepen
the liberty of our citizenry in the long-term through enhancing the individual and
moral responsibility of young adults. As we can read in Britain’s Daily Telegraph,
housing policies set in broader social policy orientations that do not operate within
this assumption thus “risk undermining the traditional family” (which is actually a
highly modern innovation of post-war capitalism), thus betraying a “mindset” that is
“anti-aspirational” (Telegraph View 2012). It is clear in such conservative discourses
that the family household is posited as the fundamental social guarantor of liberty,
security, initiative and civic virtue.
If social welfare provision must be grudgingly made in some manner, such depen-
dence of individuals on the family is deemed to be a positive condition ensuring
stronger organic bonds, care, empathy and promoting a superior form of welfare, in
contrast to the impersonal and enervating relations promoted by state social security.
In addition, such a situation is more propitious to the restoration of a morally
accountable society. The family household becomes thus a highly gendered “womb”,
a safe place, a haven, as well as an environment of encouragement and support that
engenders greater individual responsibility for personal welfare, social engagement
and individual liberty.
Such ideological familism, as Barrett and McIntosh put it (2014, 26), is currently
resurgent. One can easily find in papers like the Daily Telegraph, statements such as:
“the Conservatives should stand for individual responsibility and one of the most
responsible things a family can do is care for their children”, and that in this regard
“they should also stand for individual liberty, particularly against the state” (Perrins
2013).5 In this now dominant ideological position, liberty and responsibility (civic
virtue) are placed in direct opposition to action taken on the part of the State, a posi-
tion to which we shall return below. Personal liberty here is complacently conjoined
with devolution of welfare provision onto the family and the promotion of the family
as the single greatest institutional headwater of a free society, even and especially in
conditions of austerity politics. Of course, the notion that the nuclear family as
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understood in this limited and historically contingent form is, to a great extent, a
construction and product of the State, is never even considered let alone mentioned.
Concentrating on the British case as the most acute actualization of a broader
international theme, the position of conservative and traditionalist opinion groups
has now become the hegemonic ideological position in that state beyond a narrow
circle of political ideologists and politicians, as is evinced by even the slightest
glance at popular discourses.6 This ideologically familist theme is clearly endorsed
into strategic social policy by the recently departed Prime Minister, for whom “it’s
family that brings up children, teaches values, passes on knowledge, instills in us all
the responsibility to be good citizens” so that “long before you get to the welfare
state, it is family that is there to care for you when you are sick or when you fall on
tough times” (Cameron 2014).
In a nutshell, the family household is claimed to be a school of independence. The
rest of this article is devoted to arguing the unsettling contrary: household welfare
creates slaves.
We must consider thoughtfully the likely psycho-political effects of neglecting the
problem of affordable housing for young adults on our ‘citizens’ democratic charac-
ter in the long-term. With a chronic problem of affordable housing evident across
Europe and the United States, which stands woefully unaddressed by governments
for strategic political reasons, and with an especially acute disciplinary agenda actu-
alizing through the London-centred “housing crisis” in the British city-state, it is
imperative that a concerted attempt be made to articulate focused political theoretical
argument elaborating upon why radical strategic reform of our housing problem is a
major priority beyond its material immediacy. It is essential to clarify intelligently
what it is that is potentially so egregious about the current direction of social policy
on housing provision in more impressive historical, political, and even philosophical
terms. In particular, if we wish to influence the public policy discourse outside of
academia, we must attack the hegemonic concepts of Austerity and Neoliberalism,
and undermine them with political critical analysis. Such is what Michael Orton has
recently called for in his discussion of Hikikomori and its western differentia speci-
fica of parental co-habitation (Orton 2015). I argue that by mobilizing an immanent
critique of Liberty as the core concept of Neoliberalism, we can drive a stake
through the ideological heart of Austerity apologetics and its policy centrepiece:
welfare devolution onto the family household. Such a theoretical framework will be
essential for those who wish to formulate housing policy reform and then effectively
advocate for it politically in the jungle of conservative skeptics and neoliberal
naysayers.
Neo-Roman Liberty: Liber Homo vs. Servus
In the Anglophonic world, it is the Classical Liberal tradition of political thought
that has come to dominate our conception of Freedom or Liberty (Skinner 2006).
Despite a complex genealogical and intertextual descent (Herkunft), it seems to
derive principally from Thomas Hobbes, and as such bears the imprint of his
severely materialist corpuscular political ontology: there is nothing in existence other
than bodies in differential perpetual motion and therefore “freedom” can only refer
to the freedom of a body. This might be a body of water, an atom, or a body politic,
as well as that of a person. The hegemonic conception of liberty today is predicated
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on this assumption, which Hobbes developed in his notorious defence of absolutist
monarchy (Leviathan), and endures in exemplary fashion in numerous more recent
academic treatments of the concept (Steiner 1974–1975; Carter 2004; Kramer 2008).
The Hobbesian Liberal conception of liberty is thus simply the absence of constraint
on a body. Freedom cannot concern the freedom of a will (arbitrium), as the will is
not a body, and therefore to coerce the will is not to deprive a person of their liberty,
that is, their freedom to choose or “de-liberate”. Ever the devotee of Euclidian math-
ematics, Hobbes drew the ruthlessly logical conclusion that even if a highwayman
were to demand of you your money or your life, you are free to choose to give your
life. In this example, there is no deprivation of liberty; it is a free action. This is the
genealogical root of the Liberal theory of liberty, that to be free is to act freely in the
manner outlined above. Its central concern is with the action of bodies, and it origi-
nated out of early-modern discourses of the “new science”. It is this very limiting
idea of freedom, as the absence or removal of any bodily obstacle to act, that we
must challenge as profoundly unsatisfactory in our ruminations on housing policies.
This conceptual definition has nothing to say regarding the condition or status of
dependence, which is our chief concern here regarding the domiciled condition of
many young people today, and the generalized effect of this dependence on an
individual’s capacity to act.
From the early-modern period to the present, another tradition of political thought
has contended the Liberal. It is of ancient provenance, and originates particularly in
the legal thought of Ancient Rome, and as such has been labelled the Neo-Roman or
Neo-Republican tradition (Pettit 1997; Skinner 1998; Lovett and Pettit 2009). The
Neo-Roman concept of liberty has most conspicuously been mobilized in the history
of the Anglophonic world by the seventeenth Century polemical advocates of the
parliamentarian cause in the Civil War (1640s), and by the signatories to the United
States’ Declaration of Independence (1776), and by the framers of the US Constitu-
tion (1787–1788). This oppositional distinction has critical potential today, due to
the currently hegemonic position of the Liberal understanding of liberty in our
society (Skinner 2006). I want to follow Quentin Skinner’s formulation of this
historically discursive differentiation between Liberalism and Republicanism in
Anglophonic political philosophy and relate it to the housing problem referenced
above. In contrast to the Liberal understanding, liberty in the Neo-Roman discourse
rests on the notion of independence, and therefore must be conceived as the name
given to the “status of a person” (de statu hominem), rather than to the hindrance of
a bodily action.
At the heart of the Neo-Roman understanding of liberty is the figure of the liber
homo (free-person). The liber homo stands in clear distinction to the servus (slave)
in Roman law. There is no intermediate position in this analysis. Firstly, by slave is
meant something quite subtle and particular, yet quite straightforward. We must dis-
abuse ourselves of the image of the slave as chattel, subjected to whips and chains,
as the personal human property of another. Neither the Southern American plantation
slave, nor the ancient galley rower in Ben-Hur, has a monopoly over the definition
of a slave. Slavery is defined in the Digest of Roman Law, as “an institution of the
ius gentium [law of persons] by which someone is, contrary to nature, subject to the
dominion of someone else” (cited in Skinner 2002, 289).7 This means that to be a
servus, in contrast to a liber homo, is to be under the dominion of another person.
But what is it to be subject to the dominion of another? This is simply to be under
the arbitrary power of another person (in potestate), that is, under the will
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(artbitrium) of someone else – a Master (dominus). Note the ancient etymological
connection that binds servitude and unfreedom to the household institution
(dominus, domestic, domicile, domination, etc.). Liberty (libertas) therefore must be
understood as a condition or status,8 not as merely the bodily freedom or hindrance
of an action. This is a status of dependence on another person, who by virtue of that
relation of dependence alone has arbitrary power over you.
Pivotally, the liberty of a person is established by the extent to which they live in
a condition where they are free to exercise their will without being subject to the will
of another. If, by your status or condition, you are not free to exercise your will by
virtue of that status or condition, whether de jure or de facto, you are not a free-
person and are thus a slave. In such a condition, de facto you therefore do not live
suae potestatis, that is “possessed of a power to act according to your own will
rather than being obliged to live in dependence on the will of someone else” (cited
in Skinner 2008a, 86).9 Likewise, de jure you are not sui iuris, that is, possessed of
the capacity to act “as your own man”, and hence “in your own right”.10
In John Locke’s Two Treatises (1690), written as an intertextual speech act against
the absolutists Hobbes and Filmer, to live “under an Absolute, Arbitrary, Despotical
power” is to live in servitude. More specifically, a slave is understood to be a person
forced to live in subjugation to a Master with “an Arbitrary power over his Life”
(Locke 1988, II.24, p. 285). Therefore, freedom is “a Liberty to follow my own Will
in all things, where the Rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant,
uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man” (Locke II.23, p. 284). It was in
these terms that Parliament had opposed the attempt of Charles I to extend discre-
tionary and prerogative powers over them, and thus without a shred of exaggeration
claimed their new condition to be that of “the most abject of all bondslaves” (Parker
1999, 109; Skinner 2008c, 293). Likewise, the key motivation for the Declaration of
Independence (not a declaration of “liberty” or “freedom”, NB) was justified concep-
tually as a revolt on the part of colonial oligarchs against the exercise of arbitrary
power by an executive government, which had reduced them to the condition of
servitude and the status of slaves. It was not a revolt against any hindrance on their
bodies to act, nor a bid to experience the “freedom” of the absence of constraint, but
a revolt to secure for themselves (though not for their own chattels, of course) the
condition of in-dependence.
In contrast to the historical deployments of the Neo-Roman theorizing of liberty,
we are not concerned in this article with the structure or dynamic of the polity as a
constituted whole. What is of supreme importance are the attitudes and behaviours
that the social condition of dependence engenders in those individuals subjected to
it, although we are concerned with the effects on the polity that flow from this multi-
plicity of individuals’ statuses of servitude. What is of relevance in this conceptual
position does not relate to the question of Sovereignty. Though the historical dis-
courses under discussion here have been preoccupied with questions of political
sovereignty, the Neo-Roman conception of liberty can be easily extended to all man-
ner of social relations and statuses. This is evident from Locke’s expansive discus-
sion of the core relation in constitutional government, which he contrasts to
government predicated on biblical authority or, as in Hobbes’ Leviathan, predicated
on the war-of-all-against-all, both traditionally deployed to legitimate parental
authority in the household. He critically juxtaposes the constitutional relation
Magistrate-Subject, with the tyrannous relations of Master-Servant, Father-Children,
Husband-Wife, Lord-Slave (Locke, 1988, II.2, 268). The former relation of political
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power is legitimized by the imprimatur of constitutionality, where the status of the
subject as liber homo is secured, whether legally, institutionally, practically, or cus-
tomarily; the latter are not. From this we can see that the condition of living under
arbitrary power is not merely a relation between the individual and the Sovereign,
but is de facto reproduced in all manner of social situations.
As one illustration, throughout the 19th Century the legal status of women as
household dependents on their fathers and then husbands made slaves of them. They
did not live sui iuris. From the early-modern emergence of capitalistic social rela-
tions, women had been rendered “legal imbeciles” from their prior status as femmes
soles, the innovated assumption being that “their lives were now in the hands of
men who (like feudal lords) could exercise over them a power of life and death”
(Federici 2004, 100); almost the definition of an arbitrary power. The subordinating
and infantilising psychosocial effects of which where made clear in Wollstonecraft’s
Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792), and it wasn’t until Acts of Parliament in
the period 1870–1880 that women in Britain could legally own property or make
their own wills. This is more than a play on words; it perfectly illuminates women’s
condition of unfreedom living “under the protection and influence of her husband,
her baron, or lord”, that is, under legal Coverture; under the arbitrary power of the
Master. It is interesting to note that today Hikikomori or “parental co-habitation” is
predominantly a male phenomenon. However, far from suggesting a greater indepen-
dence or personal responsibility on the part of young women, the reason is more
likely that, subject to the same socio-economic forces, many women have resorted to
the historically time-honoured option of obtaining welfare provision by entering into
dependent relationships with male partners under whose de facto dominion they then
live as a seemingly preferable and more socially acceptable alternative to returning
to the parental home. We wonder why instances of domestic abuse against women
are on the rise. For young men, such a “preferable” option comes with a greater
social stigma attached and thus steers them towards the much more discouragingly
dysfunctional condition of parental co-habitation.
Clearly the devolution of welfare onto the parental household can mean nothing
other than the placing of individuals under the condition of financial, and thus social
and material, dependence on parent(s) in the parental household (in potestate paren-
tis), by purposive and systematic omission of action on the part of government. In
such a situation, parents by definition are either (1) placed in the privileged position
of the landlord (dominus), with coercive power over the will of their dependent who
lives under a species of Coverture, that is, not regulated by the protection of legal
contract afforded a “tenant” (sui iuris); and/or (2) the sole or main supplier of
victuals, and thus with de facto monopoly control over the direct reproduction of the
living body of the dependent (suae potestatis). Effectively, both formally and infor-
mally, the relation of dependence is universally established by definition of the cir-
cumstance itself of welfare provision devolved onto the family household. Such an
effect can hardly be denied, and is even recognized today by the harshest critics of
the dependent generation. According to Renato Brunetta, unsympathetic former
Innovation Minister in the Italian Government, “there’s a price they pay. It allows
their parents to keep control of them, emotionally, socially and financially” (Day
2015). Above this definitional minimum, dependence in such circumstances is
usually of the most physically proximate and suffocatingly intimate kind, and almost
of a totalitarian character.
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One might expect the objection at this point to be that the emotional and psycho-
logical ties of family must surely be a guarantor and protection against domination.
What of the love and care that parents give their children in the household? It is pre-
cisely the Neo-Roman argument that liberty cannot rest on just such whimsical and
unstable a basis, for surely to live at the will of another’s love is to live under condi-
tions highly conducive to tyranny. The beneficence or physical absence of a Master
is irrelevant to the status of servitude in this analysis of liberty. The ironic figure of
the “free-slave” is common in the literature of ancient comedy, who goes here and
there doing as they please as a result of the Master’s incompetence, absence, or good
will (Skinner 2008b). The status of living in potestate domini nevertheless remains,
and the entailed relations of dependence endure. The ancient Master could put to
death at any moment; the parent can burst into one’s bedroom or even evict at any
moment.
There is one inescapable feature of the dependent Master-Slave relation, and of
life under the arbitrary will of the Master, and it is foregrounded by John Milton in
his great defence of republican liberties, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates
(1649). This is the assumption that freedom is to be opposed not to actual constraint
but to possible or potential constraint (Skinner 2002, 299). It is not the actual
constraint of an action, but the potential constraint of action brought about by the
condition of dependence, that coerces the will and thus renders a person unfree. It is
living in this condition of unfreedom born of dependence, and the perpetual uncer-
tainty over the arbitrary will of another overriding one’s own at any instant, that
drives dependent individuals inexorably into the fear, anxiety and “slavishness” that
is inevitable under such conditions.
Anxieties amongst theorists of liberty over the social consequences of living in
servitude, in the manner described above, have resurfaced repeatedly over the
millennia in political discourses on liberty (Skinner 2002, 292). This is evident from
ancients such as Sallust, Tacitus and Livy, through James Harrington and Henry
Parker, Milton, Locke, Richard Price and Joseph Priestley, through 20th Century
analysts of antebellum chattel slavery in the US like Stanley Elkins, to the Neore-
publicanism today of Skinner, Pettit, et al. The assertion made again and again by
exponents of this analysis is that those who live in the condition of a slave (depen-
dence) will behave slavishly, the very condition of dependence itself, living under a
relation of arbitrary power and under the will of another, is enough to force the slave
in that condition into obsequiousness, flattery and, most importantly, self-censorship
vis-à-vis the Master on whose will they are dependent. It is the material and social
conditions of living, that is, housing arrangements, which profoundly influence the
character of the individuals subject to those relations. The result of the “slavish
patience” (Sallust, Bellum Iugurthinum. 31.1) necessary for living in potestate
domini on the character of those subjected thus is to become “so anxious and dispir-
ited that all civic virtue has been lost” (Skinner 2002, 290). Recall the Hikikomori
quote at the outset.
Experiences of young people in the condition of the servus attest to my analysis.
These are cited from The Guardian newspaper (Davies et al. 2014), in anecdotal
form, and are quite illustrative of widespread sentiments engendered by the experi-
ence of parental co-habitation. For instance, Maria (28, Dublin) says that “I do miss
having people over for dinner and too many bottles of wine. That’s hard to do when
your Mum might pop in to put on the kettle at any given moment!” Dependent adult
offspring will not set boundaries to their parents’ arbitrary and whimsical behaviour;
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to do so would seem ungrateful or cheeky. Whose house is it, after all? She
continues, “I’m lucky my parents are so supportive”. Lucky. Capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary, there are no boundaries or secure guarantees set in this condition. The good
will of the parents can evaporate in an instant, leaving the dependent without any
recourse whatsoever. Fortuna is arbitrary. For what is implicit in her wording is that
if she were not lucky, she would be powerless to resist the arbitrary will of her par-
ents when displeased by her behaviour. For Gaia (26, Piacenza),
the problem is you don’t feel empowered. And I think for us, for young
people, it’s really important to have the power to control your life and say: “I
can do this. I can have a job but I can manage my private life as well”
Independence is a prerequisite for personal self-government and souci-de-soi.
Most important of all, under conditions of dependence comes the tendency to
self-censor – “if we fear that some harm might befall us if we were to voice our less
conventional thoughts, that in itself will be sufficient to inhibit us from voicing
them” (Skinner 2002: 303). This is not self-censorship as a performative act of civil-
ity, but a routinized deformation of the Self in what James Scott called the public
transcript in the power relation between the dominant and the subjugated that
becomes more stereotypical and ritualized “the more arbitrarily it is exercised” (Scott
1992). Young people learn to bite their tongues in all manner of things around their
parents. Such a condition is surely no school of liberty and independence, but a
school that teaches silence, obedience, acceptance, resignation and humiliation, well
into adulthood. This condition is enervating of the courage necessary for “civic
greatness”, and we should be seriously concerned about generalized arrangements
that induce and inculcate such behavioural characteristics in millions of our young
citizens.
So, I have established (1) that for a young person to be forced back into the family
home is for them to be placed under a condition of dependence, that is, under the
arbitrary power of another; and (2) how one is no longer a free-person (liber homo)
in this condition of dependence, but a slave (servus); and (3) what the political and
social long-term consequences of this condition will entail for the free and demo-
cratic character of our society (civitas), if generalized as it is from a multiplicity of
individual experiences. It now remains for me to demonstrate how it is that the wills
of young individuals are in fact being coerced presently into such a condition by the
current configuration of social and material forces when they return home to live
with the parents. I will then conclude by outlining the proper role of government on
the basis of this analysis, and the kind of policy (re)directions that it demands.
Austerity, Oligarchy and the Spatio-Temporality of Capitalism
In the previous section, I have demonstrated how the status of the servus is not the
result of a “free choice”, as understood in the Liberal conception and as seems to be
assumed amongst many in our society. At the very least, I have shown how such a
Liberal conceptualization is entirely unsatisfactory for comprehending or explaining
the phenomenon of “parental co-habitation” that is popping up across the capitalist
core states. It is now necessary to establish how it is that the person of the servus in
this particular social condition is actually forced into their situation of dependence,
and that such a status is not the result of widespread and coincidental personal inertia
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on their parts. By augmenting the Neo-Roman theory of liberty with a Marxian
account of the social order, within which this theory of liberty has explanatory
valence, we can better apprehend the conditions within which arguably a generation
of “slaves” is being created. Situating the Neo-Roman analysis within a particular
historical articulation of the capitalist social order is essential if we want to champion
effectively the liber homo in capitalist modernity through policy reform.
An objection one might expect to the analysis so far is that surely no one in our
society is under the arbitrary power of another, because all are under the protection
of the law that guarantees their basic legal rights. However, this is an unacceptably
narrow way to understand relations of dependence, arbitrary power and coercion of
the will. What is essential to remember here is that, in this Neo-Roman analysis, it is
possible to live in a condition of dependence under the arbitrary will of another,
whilst still being in possession of all your basic civil rights (Skinner 2006). As Marx
famously summarized, “between equal rights, force decides” (1990, 344). Social
relations of coercion operate and exist beyond the naïve boundaries of legal
definition.
Those who believe that a young adult in the situation of parental co-habitation can
leave the household “at will”, and must therefore personally accept the consequences
of “choosing” not to do so, falls into the dubious position of accepting Hobbes’
choice (as offered in the highwayman example) as an unproblematically free choice.
Under the conditions of capitalistic social relations, the household is perpetually
being reforged to serve precisely the disciplinary function that coerces and restrains
the members of the household, coercing (or rather “co-linearizing”) their wills and
thus precluding free exit. In this condition, the household becomes a strategic device
in the social apparatus of epithumogenesis, wherein an engineered asymmetric rela-
tion of dependence renders a person “ipso facto dominated” by virtue of that “depen-
dence of an interest on another person”, which is enforced by spatio-temporal
circumstance and functions as a “relation of command” distributing individuals
“bi-jectively” to their places in the new division of labour (Lordon 2014, 106). This
epithumogenetic apparatus of “co-linearization” with the master-desire has the effect
and intention of “fixing the enlistees’ desire” to certain objects out of the heterogene-
ity of desire-objects encountered by an individual in the multiplicity of lived experi-
ence. In particular, this is just one more historical instance in the capitalist society of
the “the reconstruction of the [nuclear] family as the locus for the production of
labor-power” (Federici 2004, 95), in collusive service to “the buyer of labour-power”
(Lordon 2014, 106), but that precludes democratic political participation and access
to society’s accumulated capital surplus. Such individuals are effectively dispos-
sessed in absolute terms, whilst many of them nevertheless continue to produce
surplus value, which is then realized elsewhere and by others.
In addition, it must be born in mind that the generation of “slaves” to which I refer
will not be an entire generation, but a contribution toward a class formation
immanent to that generation. The dismantling of state welfare is tasked with this
very end, to remove any choice and force younger generations into the orbit of the
family and household economy in order to be disciplined, controlled, tranched and
carefully placed in the new regime of production and consumption. By removing
state welfare, employment possibilities, free education, affordable housing, etc., pur-
posively through a concerted political class project called Austerity, any such exit
options are severely restricted for millions of young people who are forced by social
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and material conditions into a status of dependence on others, regardless of any
minimal legal protection under the criminal code of the common law.
It is not simply that the parent within the household constitutes “the Master” who
exercises arbitrary power over the youth, a configuration whereby each house is
turned into an isolated petty fief. The parent as master must rather be grasped as a
point of contact, within the institution of the household, to a vast technology of coer-
cive organization that is the Society of Control (Deleuze 1992) driven by capitalist
imperatives. The parent is just one of the most intimate and proximate instantiations
of the “meta-disciplinary” apparatus of the capitalist megamachine (Welsh 2016),
occupying the place of foreman or subaltern in the household as social vertex, some-
what akin to the NCO, gaoler, teacher, caseworker, in other institutional settings.
Government Action and Housing Policy Imperative
In Classical Liberal ideology, intervening and socially ameliorative strategic action
on the part of the State is anathema. If freedom is the absence of constraint on a
body, then the intervention of the State, whether through legal or political means,
annihilates by definition the liberty of the subjects on whom such an intervention is
applied. By devolving welfare onto the family, via both the founding act of govern-
ment action and then subsequent ideological inaction, the British Government in par-
ticular endorses this position. However, in the Neo-Roman conception of liberty,
government action bears no necessary stigma of unfreedom, and in fact is often nec-
essary for the establishment of a society (civitas) of free-persons. This is easily com-
patible with the Ordo-Liberal problematic of “police power”, whereby the State
intervenes in the regulation of a given population in order to further the strength and
future prosperity of that population (Foucault 2007, 2010). This is its political rea-
son, and is actualized through the State’s “art of government”.
Locke himself elaborates the necessity for Liberty to be secured by the actions of
the State in precisely this way. He elaborates that the “Freedom of Men under
Government, is, to have a standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that
Society and made by the Legislative Power erected in it” (Locke, 1988, II.23, 284).
That “rule” is not so much the rule of law, as some might presume, but the secured
common condition of each individual as a liber homo, and is to be made by the leg-
islative power erected in it. This is a clear mandate for the State to act positively so
as to establish the status of free-persons as a minimum equality of autonomy accord-
ing to natural law. Similarly, several decades later in discussions over the formal
establishment of civil liberty and independence in the Thirteen Colonies, Alex
Hamilton reminded his peers that “it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of gov-
ernment is essential to the security of liberty” (Hamilton 1961, 35). At the heart of
these positions, the assumption is that government action can secure the conditions
for liberty in the generality. Government non-agenda abandons the individual to the
(literally) uncivilized caprice of the war-of-all-against-all, where, far from realizing
an immanently anarchic state of nature, such an anarchy is imposed in contravention
of the freedom of persons according to natural law. The result is vampirism, brig-
andage and the subjugation under Masters of various colours, which are given free
reign to dominate those forced into conditions of dependence by social forces and
the political ambitions of others in violation of the equality of natural law.
The reason why the proper action of government, in the manner I have described,
does not contravene one’s status as a liber homo, stems from the constitutionality of
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that action. In contrast to living in potestate parentis, the action of the State is
prescribed by lawful limitation with opportunities and structures for proper recourse.
In contrast, decision-making and exercise of power in the household is entirely arbi-
trary, and although one might argue that such arbitrary power is limited to matters
within that household alone, the fact that the individual youth is forced to be there
by the politically contingent and circumstantial forces of an omnipresent capitalist
society in crisis and politically prosecuted Austerity, means that (as with the victim
of the highwayman) there is little or no option to exit from that micro fief of arbi-
trary power.
In the case of the Nordic countries, states with much lower levels of parental
co-habitation (Spiegel 2013),11 there is much greater State provision of welfare,
including various supplementary benefits for students and other social groups within
the youth demographic that are explicitly tasked with relieving housing and accom-
modation difficulties. In the Liberal conception of liberty, these social-democratic
structures and policy arrangements are assumed to be components of a politics predi-
cated on a “positive liberty” that invests the State with the role of realising the
authentic being of individuals in an otherwise alienating capitalist society (Berlin
1979). To Liberals, this role substitutes for the individual’s own responsibility and
initiative, thus enervating in the long-term their dynamism, freedom of action and
personal responsibility. It is the “nanny state”, in a nutshell.
However, given the Neo-Roman concept of liberty and the analysis of welfare
devolution onto the family given above, such welfare structures supplied by the State
actually function to establish and secure the conditions of individuals’ independence
(from much more proximate landlords, parents, masters), even though some appeti-
tive freedom of action is curtailed (i.e. individuals cannot spend benefits on sports
cars or steak dinners, as they might if they retained a greater proportion of their
taxable income). Thus, the State does not force you to be free in such cases, as the
Liberal critics of positive liberty would definitionally claim, it rather secures young
peoples’ statuses as liberi homines in the context of capitalist social imperatives, thus
providing them with the basis to pursue their goals, desires and obligations freely. In
short, the State secures conditions for the exercise of their free wills as individuals,
that is, their ethical autonomy. We ponder over the greater freedoms, educational
attainments and quality of life that are often manifest in those societies. Rather than
bastions of any putative socialist nannying, perhaps they are simply societies of
greater freedom and personal autonomy in this regard, from which civic greatness
flows.
However, such particular policy initiatives will only have any penetrative signifi-
cance if part of a wider political transformation and a new strategic direction, which
in turn will only be possible in the event of a widespread reorientation of the hege-
monic ideology and its various political, cultural and ethical, assumptions. I have
attempted in this article to supply a political theoretical way of viewing the current
housing situation in a way that illuminates its oppressive and destructive actuality. It
is for others to develop policy alternatives and solutions in the depths and details of
housing policy and governmental action that will release young people from their
servitude and return to them their statuses as free-persons.
Politically, in the British case, it seems that there will have to be a reckoning in
the city-state. Either the future strategic direction will benefit a younger generation,
who require affordable housing and access to education and employment, or it will
continue to benefit those older generations and metropolitan elites who have shielded
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themselves from the wage-repression and privatisations of the neoliberal period by
resort to personal asset price inflation as compensation. Even within the minimal
interventionist rationality of neoliberal government, the failure of the State to take
action in this chronic housing situation will likely engender a progressive dissipation
of the population of the state-territory in generations to come. The option of a stu-
dious non-agenda and masterly inactivity regarding affordable housing, is an abnega-
tion of even the neoliberal state’s obligations to its police function and the pastorate
of its “governmental rationality” (Foucault 2007, 2010). In political cultural terms,
we have to ask ourselves whether a long-term strategic policy direction that produces
a generation of “slaves”, or at least of “slavish” character, rather than a generation of
well educated, motivated and independent individuals intuitively disposed to speak
truth to power, is worth the short-term benefit of pleasing those electoral fractions
deemed of greater strategic importance for political parties in office. If we wish to
combat the formation of a malignant oligarchy in the heart of our democratic state,
spearheaded by strategies such as parental co-habitation, then we must demand gov-
ernment action in the area of housing policy that establishes and maintains social
and political conditions that promote and secure individuals’ independence and self-
government, regardless of the cynical indifference or capricious impotence engen-
dered by capitalism’s new topologies.
Notes
1. See Welsh (2017)
2. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-demography/young-adults-living-with-parents/2013/sty-young-
adults.html
3. Online @ http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-demography/young-adults-living-with-parents/2013/
sty-young-adults.html
4. Whilst the family household is also a socio-culturally contingent formation, varying subtly from
society to society, the basic “nuclear” dynamic persists as a fairly stable form across the modern
societies of Europe and the United States. A generalizing argument is therefore still justifiable,
providing that is it remains sensitive to the variations in sociocultural particularity that make it a
contingent feature of a given society up to a point.
5. My Italics.
6. As an illustration, consider a recent interview with the glossy magazine Woman and Home, where
daytime TV host Holly Willoughby waxed prosaic of her idyllic childhood, claiming “my family
are my support system” (Young 2015, 1). By referring to the family household principally as
“support system”, she faithfully reproduces a now very prevalent ideological semantic in the UK
that places the family beyond any narrow set of emotional and psychological relations conven-
tionally constituting a kinship group. Rather, the family is clearly now accepted by many as a
structure of welfare provision in its broadest social sense.
7. Digest 1985, I. V. 4. vol. 1, p. 15.
8. Though I use the words “status” and “condition” interchangeably, “status” remains more true to
the idiom of Roman jurisprudence, where it refers to the de jure situation of a person in a legal
framework. However, in this analysis I perhaps prefer “condition” as the de facto positionality of
a person in a matrix of social relations and forces.
9. Digest 1985, I. VI. 4. vol. 1, p. 18.






Barrett, M., and M. McIntosh. 2014. The Anti-social Family. London: Verso.
Berlin, I. 1979. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buck, T. 2014. “Spanish Youth in Crisis.” FT Magazine, May 23. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5908da36-
db09-11e3-8273-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.
Cameron, D. 2014. “David Cameron on Families.” Gov.Com, August 18. https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/speeches/david-cameron-on-families.
Cameron, G., J. Muellbauer, and A. Murphy. 2006. Was There a British House Price Bubble? Evidence
From a Regional Panel. Department of Economics, Oxford University, Oxford, UK.
Carter, I. 2004. A Measure of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chu, B. 2016. “The One Chart That Shows How UK Houses Are Now Even More Unaffordable.” Inde-
pendent Online, April 28. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/the-one-chart-that-
shows-how-uk-houses-are-now-even-more-unaffordable-a7004796.html.
Cumming, E. 2013. “Boomerang Generation: The Young Adults Living Back with Parents.” The Tele-
graph Online, August 19. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/property/property-market/10245125/
Boomerang-Generation-the-young-adults-living-back-with-parents.html.
Davies, L., Fishwick, C., and Orange, R. 2014. “‘I’d Love to Have My Own Place’: Young Europeans
on the Struggle to Fly the Nest.” The Guardian Online, March 25. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/mar/25/id-love-to-have-my-own-place-young-europeans-on-the-struggle-to-fly-the-nest.
Day, M. 2015. “Rise of the ‘Mammone’: Two-thirds of Young Italian Adults Live at Home with their
Parents.” The Independent Online, February 27. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
rise-of-the-mammone-twothirds-of-young-italian-adults-live-at-home-with-their-parents-10034641.
html.
Deleuze, G. 1992. “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” October 59: 3–7.
Federici, S. 2004. Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation. Brooklyn:
Autonomedia.
Foucault, M. 2007. Territory, Security, Population: Lectures at the Collège De France 1977–1978.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Foucault, M. 2010. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France 1978–1979.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fry, R. 2013. “A Rising Share of Young Adults Live in Their Parents’ Home.” Pew Research Center,
August 1. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/01/a-rising-share-of-young-adults-live-in-their-
parents-home/.
Furlong, A. 2008. “The Japanese Hikikomori Phenomenon: Acute Social Withdrawal among Young
People.” The Sociological Review 56 (2): 309–325.
Hamilton, A. 1961. “Federalist #10.” In The Federalist, edited by C. Rossiter, 33–37. New York: New
American Library.
Hardt, M., and A. Negri. 2005. Multitude. London: Penguin.
Harvey, D. 1972. “Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory in Geography and the Problem of
Ghetto Formation.” Antipode 4 (2): 1–13.
Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harvey, D. 2006. Limits to Capital. London: Verso.
Harvey, D. 2010. The Enigma of Capital, and the Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile Books.
Kaneko, S. 2006. “Japan’s ‘Socially Withdrawn Youths’ and Time Constraints in Japanese Society:
Management and Conceptualization of Time in a Support Group for ’hikikomori’.” Time & Society
15 (2–3): 233–249.
Kramer, M. H. 2008. “Liberty and Domination.” In Republicanism and Political Theory, edited by
C. Laborde and J. W. Maynor, 31–57. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kremer, W., and C. Hammond. 2013. “Hikikomori: Why Are So Many Japanese Men Refusing to Leave
Their Rooms?” BBC News Magazine, July 5. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-23182523.
Lazzarato, M. 2015. Governing by Debt. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e).
Locke, J. 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lordon, F. 2014. Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza & Marx on Desire. New York: Verso.
Lovett, F., and P. Pettit. 2009. “Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program.”
Annual Review of Political Science 12: 11–29.
Marx, K. 1990. Capital: Volume 1. London: Penguin.
The Politics of “Parental Co-Habitation” 17
Orton, M. 2015. “Anxiety Society: We Need Politics to Reverse Our Cultural Condition of Stress.” The
Staggers: Statesman Online Blog, January 12.
Overbeek, H., and B. van Apeldoorn. 2012. “Introduction: The Life Course of the Neoliberal Project
and the Global Crisis.” In Neoliberalism in Crisis, edited by H. Overbeek and B. van Apeldoorn,
1–20. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan.
Panitch, L., and S. Gindin. 2011. “Capitalist Crises and the Crisis This Time.” Socialist Register 47:
1–20.
Parker, H. [1640] 1999. “The Case of Shipmony Briefly Discoursed.” In The Struggle for Sovereignty:
Seventeenth-Century English Political Tract: Volume 1, edited by J. L. Malcolm, 93–125.
Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Inc.
Perrins, L. 2013. “Stay at Home Mothers are Persona Non Grata to the Conservatives.” Telegraph
Online, October 1. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/mother-tongue/10347653/Conservative-
Party-Conference-Stay-at-home-mothers-are-persona-non-grata-to-the-Conservatives.html.
Pettit, P. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Poulantzas, N. 2014. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso.
Reich, R. 1991. The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Saito, T. 2013. Hikikomori: Adolescence Without End. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Scott, J. C. 1992. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Shah, N. 2015. “Yes, More Young Adults are Living with their Parents, and It’s Probably because of
Student Debt.” The Wall Street Journal Online, February 4. http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/
02/04/yes-more-young-adults-are-living-with-their-parents-and-its-probably-because-of-student-debt/
Skinner, Q. 1998. Liberty before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Q. 2002. Visions of Politics, Volume 2: Renaissance Virtues. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Skinner, Q. 2006. “Concepts of Liberty.” 2006 Lecture Series. Lecture Conducted from the University of
Sydney, Australia. http://sydney.edu.au/podcasts/2006/skinner.shtml.
Skinner, Q. 2008a. “Freedom as the Absence of Arbitrary Power.” In Republicanism and Political
Theory, edited by C. Laborde and J. W. Maynor, 83–101. Oxford: Blackwell.
Skinner, Q. 2008b. “A Genealogy of Liberty.” Una’s Lectures. Sponsored by the Townsend Center for
the Humanities, UC Berkeley, CA. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECiVz_zRj7A.
Skinner, Q. 2008c. “John Milton as a Theorist of Liberty.” The Lady Margaret Lectures: John Milton
400th Anniversary Celebrations. Lecture Conducted from the University of Cambridge, UK. http://
milton.christs.cam.ac.uk/skinner.htm.
Soja, E. 2010. Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London:
Verso.
Spiegel. 2013. “Hotel Mama: Bad Economy Has Young Europeans at Home.” Der Spiegel Online,
January 14. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/bild-877616-447811.html.
Sprigings, N. 2008. “Buy-to-Let and the Wider Housing Market.” People, Place & Policy Online 2 (2):
76–87.
Sprigings, N. 2013. “The End of Majority Home-Ownership: The Logic of Continuing Decline in a
Post-crash Economy.” People, Place & Policy Online 7 (1): 14–29.
Steiner, H. 1974–1975. “Individual Liberty.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75: 33–50.
Telegraph View. 2012. “Family Values are Being Undermined.” Telegraph Online, March 5. http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/9123820/Family-values-are-beingundermined.html.
Teo, A. 2012. “Modern-day Hermits: The Story Hikikomori in Japan and beyond.” The University of
Michigan Center for Japanese Studies. Lecture Conducted from the University of Michigan, MI.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70bv5gaN4LI.
Vespa, J. and C.Burd. 2014. “White Picket Fences: Housing Markets and the Living Arrangements of
the Millennial Generation.” Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Population Association of
America: 2014 Annual Meeting Program, Boston, MA, May 1–3. http://paa2014.princeton.edu/pa
pers/140877




Welsh, J. 2016. “The Meta-disciplinary: Capital at the Threshold of Control.” Critical Sociology [Online
First]. doi:10.1177/0896920516628308.
Welsh, J. (2017). The Political Ontology of City-State London: The Road to Brexit and Beyond.
Willetts, D. 2011. The Pinch: How the Baby Boomers Took Their Children’s Future – And Why They
Should Give It Back. London: Atlantic Books.
Young, V. 2015. “Holly Willoughby after a Third Baby.” Woman and Home, April.
The Politics of “Parental Co-Habitation” 19
